My viewpoint concerning inflation, much less, hyperinflation,  has been documented, on this forum,  but John Hussman of the Hussman fund, puts into perspective my views on this debate, the italics are my own.

  Also I have included, the commentary of the blog site Nathan's Economic Edge, which talk's about food "inflation". 

  "A note on quantitative easing

"One of the things I'm increasingly dismayed to learn is that no matter how much detail, data, and qualification I might include in these commentaries, my conclusions will often be summed up by writers or bloggers in a single sentence that often bears no relation to my point. For instance, my view that quantitative easing will trigger a "jump depreciation" in the dollar has evidently placed me among analysts warning of hyperinflation and Treasury default (a club whose card is nowhere in my wallet).

To clarify once again - I emphatically do not anticipate inflationary pressures until the second half of this decade. As I've repeatedly emphasized, the primary driver of inflation - historically and across countries - has been growth in government spending for purposes that do not expand the productive capacity of the economy. It does not matter what form the government liabilities take, because default-free government liabilities and central bank notes are nearly perfect portfolio substitutes (though extreme deficits do tend to be monetized eventually). That said, the seeds of inflation can often remain dormant for years before emerging.

The price level is nothing more than a ratio: the "marginal utility" of goods and services divided by the "marginal utility" of government liabilities. Heavy demand for goods and services in the presence of production constraints is inflationary because it increases the numerator, while credit fears and precautionary cash balances reduce inflation pressures because they increase the denominator. Presently, there is no reason to anticipate inflation until we observe some combination of robust demand for goods and services, production constraints, or reduced demand for cash balances and other government liabilities.

Quantitative easing does not pressure the dollar by fueling inflation. It has a much more subtle effect (but one that can be expected to be amplified if fiscal policy is long-run inflationary as it is at present). Normally, equilibrium in capital flows between countries is achieved through changes in interest rates. As a result, countries with greater capital needs or higher long-run inflation tendencies also have higher interest rates. If interest rates can adjust, exchange rates don't have to. But notice what quantitative easing does: by sitting on long-term bond yields (and creating a negative real interest rate differential versus other countries), quantitative easing prevents bond prices from acting as an adjustment factor, and forces the burden of adjustment on the exchange rate.

While some observers have noted that the value of the Japanese yen did not deteriorate dramatically over the full course of quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan - from its beginning until it was finally wound down - this argument misses the point. The exchange rate depreciation occurs as a jump adjustment in order to set up a subsequent appreciation over time. That gradual appreciation is needed to offset the lost interest difference caused by the policy of zero interest rates.

If you look carefully at Japan's experience over the past decade, that's just what happened. After a period when most market participants expected the Bank of Japan to move to a more neutral policy stance - the market had priced in a modest rate hike in July 2000 - the collapse of Sogo bank that month moved the BOJ back to a zero-interest rate policy, which was followed by explicit quantitative easing several months later. In the 18 months following Sogo's collapse, the yen depreciated by more than 20% (the number of yen purchased by one U.S. dollar increased from 105 to 135). That initial depreciation then set up a subsequent yen appreciation to make up the lost interest rate differential. The chart below traces the path of the yen versus the level implied by purchasing power parity (PPP).

In short, quantitative easing is not a story about inflation. It is a story about capital market equilibrium and the need for exchange rates to act as the adjustment variable when the central bank lays its weight on the bond market. The likely outcome of quantitative easing is not hyperinflation. Rather QE is likely to provoke a relatively quick plunge in the exchange value of the U.S. dollar.

 From Nathan"s Economic blogsite:

   "You see, in 2004, we had shifted from a tech market bubble to a housing bubble. The “consumer” was getting more wealthy on paper as their home values shot up and they were able to leverage that into spending. Now we have a bubble in DEBT INSTRUMENTS, and we’re trying like mad to create a bubble in food and other commodities, but those bubbles are different in that they act as a TAX to the consumer, the opposite of the housing bubble. Let that sink in, it’s very important."